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An underdeveloped country, such as India, serves as a 
prime example of economic developmental theory - with all of its 
complications and problems. Agriculture holds the key position in 
the total scheme of economic development - particularly in an 
underdeveloped country. For the agricultural sector, being the 
predominant sector, must muster together all the elements of 
development in order to care for the needs of its population and 
at the same time generate development in the industrial sector. 
It must be kept in mind that the key to development in India 
will , in the long run, depend on the success of its industrial 
development . This, in no way lessens the importance of the agricultural 
sector. For India is far from reaching her goal of becomi ng an 
industrialized nation, at the present time. This relationship 
between agriculture and industrialization must be kept in proper 
perspective. Unfortunately, Indian planning officals have , in the 
past, failed to see the correct relationship between the two. Early 
in the Second Five - Year Plan , there was a sharp shift of interest 
to industrial development at the sacrifice of the agricultural 
sector . This premature shift cost the Indian people dearly on their 
road of development and they were forced by the reality of their 
economic condition to return to the development of the agricultural 
sector to its fullest extent in order to make the way ready for 
Indian industrialization. 
The economic problems of an underdeveloped nation differ 
greatly from those of the more advanced nations of the world and 
it is, many times, difficult to appreciate the issues and reasons 
for the complexity of economic principles when applied to the 
seemingly- simple underdeveloped countries. 
It is very much easier to transplant 
the fruits of economic development, 
or at least go through the motions of 
doing so, than to transplant the seeds. 
It is fatally easy to transplant them, 
not as end products but in isolation, 
divorced from the process which has 
created them in the industrialized 
nations. Treated in such a fashion, 
these fruits of economic development 
have a way of putrefying and even 
checking development itself. 1 
Through an understanding of the vicious circles which the 
2 
economy of an underdeveloped country finds itself, realization of 
the complexity of India ' s growth problem is more easily attained. 
In an underdeveloped country we are faced with a system not only 
of vicious circles, but of vicious circles within vicious circles. 
There is the dominant vicious circle of low production. An 
underdeveloped country is poor because it has no industry; and has 
no industry because it is poor. 
A vicious circle between agriculture and industry appears. 
There are two lines of industrialization which would be promising 
to agriculture - (a) the manufacturing of goods that can serve as 
incentive goods to farmers. In reality, subsistence farming, lack 
of division of labor, and premonetary arrangements prevail in under-
developed countries due to the lack in supply of incentive goods. 
(b) The production of agricultural tools and equipment suitable for 
raising agricultural productivity . However , low agricultural output 
prevents the importation or domestic production of improved 
equipment, and the lack of equipment prevents higher agricultural 
2 
output. 
1 
Hans vi . Singer , "Vicious Circles in Underdeveloped Economies," 
Economic Issues and Policies , ed . Arthur L. Grey , Jr. and John E. 
Elliott , (Houghton Niffin Co., New York , 1961), p . 329 . 
2 
Ibid., p . 330. 
3 
Underdeveloped countries, with the modest resources at their 
disposal and with a natural impatience for results, are under 
constant temptation to skip the necessary external economies and 
engage in premature projects which fail to attain their full 
productivity for the lack of external economies, or else to sit 
3 
back hopelessly and do nothing. 
Population poses an ominous barrier against economic develop-
ment. It is likely that a nation who sustains development and 
industrialization long enough will reach a point of a lowered birth 
rate, which releases greater sources for investment . However, it 
seems that this stage is never reached in the underdeveloped nation 
because the immediate effect of small improvements is such as to 
throw the underdeveloped country back to its starting point in 
population control. 
Another important problem tncludes the political complexities 
1'TYJich have a vicious circle all their own. The desire for economic 
development mayor may not arise from popular feelings and popular 
pressures, but in underdevelo ed countries it is always the govern-
ment that has to formulate the desire and translate the desire into 
action. This dependence of economic development on government 
action has two signficant implications. (a) There is the problemof 
government stability. Underdeveloped nations need stability of 
government far more than industrialized countries, where development 
is automatic . At the same time, the very lack of economic develop-
ment in many countries makes for instability of government. (b) The 
soundest advice on economic development would generally be in the 
direction of patience. To proceed until enough resources for 
sizable investment and for the creation of external economies can 
3 
Ibid . , p . 331. 
4 
be accumulated. "To the peoples of underdeveloped countries, this 
4 
is highly unpalatable advice; to their governments, it is Q~cceptable.JI 
The growing literature on economic development has recognized 
the important place of agriculture in the underdeveloped countries. 
It has been argued that economic development requires that a vast 
number of people should shift out of agriculture. If a vast 
number of rural people shifts out of the a gricultural sector of 
the economy, then alternative sources of employment must be made 
available in the non- agricultural sector. This means that sUbstan-
tial industrialization is necessary if this agricultural population 
is to find more productive non- agricultural employment . This would 
permit those who remain in agriculture to organize their farms in 
more efficient, large - scale units. According to the principle of 
efficiency, resources should be transferred from employment in 
which productivity is low to those in which it is high . ~uch a 
marginal transfere brings about an increas e in output. In a sit-
uation where labor is so maladjusted that its excessive application 
in anyone line has brought its marginal physical productivity very 
close to zero , the gain from shifts are: (1) from increase in 
productivity of men remaining in their former occupations since 
the withdrawal of superfluous men may lead to organizational im-
provements and thus may make an increase in output per man hour 
possible ; (2) f r om gainful employment of formerly unproductive 
workers if they are supplied with tools and raw materials with 
4 
Ibid . , p . 332- 333. 
5 
5 
which to work . Taking a long period perspective , these conclusions 
"are beyond cavil for any underdeveloped country. But as guides 
to the establishment of short- run planning goals these conclusions 
6 
are often misleading ." 
In a closed economy where there is the absense of international 
trade, one of the important pre - conditions of industrial expansion 
is the achievement of an increase in agricultural productivity. 
Rising agricultural productivity sustains industrial growth in 
three important ways . First, it allows agriculture to release part 
of its labor force for industrial employment while at the same time 
meeting the increasing food needs of the non- agricultural sector. 
Second, it increases agricultural incomes. This creates, on the 
one hand, rural purchasing p01V'er needed to buy the new industrial 
goods and, on the other hand, rural savings which may be mobilized 
to finance industrial development. Third , it enables agriculture 
to supply the major wage goods to industrial workers at prices 
7 
favorable to the new industry. 
In the open economy or in an economy which has access to 
international trade, the contribution of rising productivity to 
industrial development may not be as high as it was in the closed 
5 
S .K . Al'lasthi, "Agriculture and Economic Development, " 
Economic Affairs, (New Delhi, September, 1968), p. 217. 
6 
Ibid., p . 217 . 
7 
H. Arthur Lewis, TheorK of Economic Growth , (George Allen 
& Urwin, London, 1955), p. 33 • 
6 
economy. Here the nation may find it more economical to import 
some of its food needs. 
Industrialization increases the demand for wage goods and 
food is initially the most important wage good. This results in 
more favorable markets for agricultural products. And this tends 
to break down the stagnant subsistence of the agricultural sector. 
There will be no incentive for producers of primary goods to 
increase output by extension of cultivation, adoption of new 
cultivation methods, introduction of new crops, unless they are 
certain of an expanding market for their products . Thus, as 
higher incomes in the agricultural sector help to absorb finished 
products of the non- agricultural sector, rise in income levels in 
the industrial sector raises the demand for agricultural products. 
Industrialization creates more productive non- agricultural employment 
opportunities. 
If farm labor is thus absorbed and if this 
absorbtion proceeds far enough, increasing 
labor scarCity in agriculture will raise 
direct or imputed farm wages. Thus, those 
who remain in agriculture must find ways of 
raising the productivity so that they are 
North these higher wages. In as much as the 
agricultural sector in many underdeveloped 
countries is incapable of generating sufficient 
savings to bring about any improvement, it 
find financial resources from outside. But 
where agriculture is develpping in step with 
industry, the flow of savings will be in 
both directions. 8 
Thus it is clear that rising agricultural productivity and 
industrial development have much to contribute to one another. 
But the problem of fixing priorities is a difficult one~ The 
answer does not lie in balanced agricultural and industrial 
development. This is because of the fact that in an underdeveloped 
country , the resources are severely limited. Thus the application 
8 Awasthi, p. 219. 
7 
of these limited resources in a balanced fashion may spread so 
thin that they are below minimum levels for both sectors. However, 
some sense of balance is unavoidable in that lithe minimizing of 
the waste of productive resources that results when one sector of 
the economy acts for an unnecessarily long time as the effective 
9 
lirni ting factor (bottleneck) on the gr01IJth of other sectors." One 
sP('tor of the economy can hold back another in either of two '1lays -
by failing to provide it with essential materials or services and 
also by failing to provide a market for its product or service. 
If industrial production expands while agricultural production 
does not, the excess income of the industrial sector would exert 
a pressure on the limited supply of the primary sector. This 
would result in the generation of inflationary pressures. If 
increases in agricultural production take place while the non-
agricultural sector remains stagnant, the demand for agricultural 
products will fall short of supply. This would lead to a depression 
in agricultural prices and a fall in incomes and this would also 
hamper growth. 
If balanced agricultural and industrial development cannot be 
put into practice, it is therefore necessary to make a choice and 
economists have fallen into two groups with regard to the prefereence 
over the relative emphasis which agricultural investment should 
rece1ve. T . W. bchultz, Coale and Hoover, Khan , and Jacob Viner 
9 
Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, Population G~owth and 
~conomic Develo ment in Low- Income Countries: A Case of India ' s 
Prospective, (Princeton University Press, Princeton , 195 • p. 119 . 
8 
argue that efforts to increase food supply should receive highest 
priority. ::' chultz comments: "In a high food grain economy where 
most of the economic income of the community is represented by food, 
there is little room except in agriculture for new and better 
production possibilities, because the productive efforts required to 
10 
produce food are so large a part of the whole." Coale and Hoover 
argue that "very substantial progress in that most backwards part 
of the (Indian) economy" (agriculture) is "a prerequisite to 
successful development of the ••• economy as a whole" and that "if 
one sector limits the growth of the other, it is more likely to be 
a case of agricultural growth limiting non- agricultural rather than 
11 
visa-versa." 
~conomists like Higgins, Leibenstein, Albert Hirchman, K.K. 
Kurihara recognize the need for raising agricultural productivity 
but conclude that this can be accomplished only be g iving a "big - push" 
industrialization program top priority. Opposing the views of the 
economists \'Tho stressed the the need for agricultural- dominated 
development in underdeveloped countries at the International 
Conference of e conomic Growth in Tokyo in April, 1967, Professor 
Kunneth K. Kurihara pointed out that this would be an unwise 
policy because of three considerations. Firstly, the marg inal 
productivity of capital in agriculture is lower than in industry. 
Thus, it would be uneconomic to waste away the meager capital 
resources by investing in agriculture. Secondly , the propoensity 
10 
T. W. Schultz, The Dconomic OrganizatlaR af Agriculture, 
(filcGraw-Hill, New York, 1963), p. 273 . 
11 
Coale and Hoover , pp. 120, 139. 
9 
to save in the agricultural sector is less than in the industrial 
sector. Thirdly, in so far as there is a tendency for the terms 
of trade to move a gainst agricultural goods, concentration on the 
development of agriculture would have an adverse effect on the 
12 
country ' s balance of payments. Therefore, a "balanced increase 
in agricultural output and industrial output is a luxury which an 
advanced e conomy with abundant real capital can easily afford. 
With limited savings and capital using projects competing for 
these limitied savings , an underdeveloped economy would do well 
to concentrate on the development of its industrial sector and to 
1.3 
let its agricultural sector develop by repercussions." 
Excessive reliance on agriculture prevents underdeveloped 
economies from quickly rais i ng the level of per capita incomes 
because agriculture is not organized on a commercial basis, but it 
i s treated as a way of life. When there is a high percentage of 
the labor force engaged in a griculture, this sector contributes 
t he larges t share to the gross national product. In consequence, 
there is concnetration only in p r imary production of foodstuffs, 
raw materials, and forest products. The majority of people 
depend upon the land for their livihood. This gives ri se to 
economic problems of land holding, land tenure, tenancy rights which 
need be to urgently solved if agriculture is to become a profitable 
12 
Awasthi, p. 220. 
1.3 
K.K. Kurihara, "Theoretical Objections to Agricultural 
Biased "'; conomic Development, I' Indian J ournal of ~conomics, (New 
De lhi, December, 1958) , pp. 16.3- 169. 
10 
occupation. 
"The unit of ownership and the operational holding are the 
two distinct entities which are fundamental to an understanding of 
14 
the land tenure problems in any agarian economy." An uneven 
distribution of land ownership merely aggrevates the problem, for 
the growth of population without the proper siphoning off of the 
surplus agricultural population makes the problem one of a permanent 
nature. "So long as land remains an economic opportunity for the 
large owners having control over land use and marketing, so long 
as the mounting population exerts itself to reduce the standard of 
living which in turn gets capitalized into higher land values, 
mere vesting of ownership rights to the operators would come to 
15 
nothings." 
In any analysis of land tenure, three aspects emerge out of 
the discussion - (1) overpopulation and its consequences; (2) the 
operational holding; and (}) the uneven distribution of ownership. 
Whatever the definition of overpopulation , it is true that with 
a growth rate of 2 percent and 80 percent of the gainfully occupied 
population dependent on agriculture, a large scale underemployment 
exists in rural India and a large portion of the rural population 
can disappear without the slightest effect in national income. 
The effect of overpopulation is thus felt in every level from the 
landless laborers through the tenants to the landowners. The over-
all effect is, however, a downward trend in the size of the holdings. 
14 
Salil Kumar Sanyal, "Some Topics Re lated to Land Tenure 
Problems in India," Economic Affairs, (New Delhi, October, 1968), 
p. 225. 
15 
Ibid., p. 225. 
11 
Since in India, large families are the rule , on account of the 
working of inheritance laws, the holdings get subdivided and 
fragmented. This may lead to an effect in the cropping pattern 
where it may be necessary to produce high income yielding crops per 
unit of land even though national interests, market outlets and 
16 
other conditions may call for production of more extensive crops. 
There is one striking feature of Indian land holding and that 
is the ratio of working members to total members changes very 
little over the different scales of household operational holdings. 
Thic can be seen from the data of Table 1 : 
PR8C l~N'l'AGE OF \VORKING AND NOT WORKING l'lEllfB.t':RS BY SIZE OF HOUS~HOLD 
OPERATIONAL HOLDING , AGRICULTURAL YEAR 1960 - 1961. 
size of house - Percentage of 
hold operational household size working not working 
holding (acres) members members 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4 ) 
1 up to 0 . 49 2.71 4.3.9 56 . 1 
2 0.50- 0·99 4.59 4.3.1 56.9 
.3 1.00- 2.49 4 . 77 4.3.8 56 • .3 
4 2.50- 4.99 5 . 27 4.3.1 56 . 9 
5 5.00- 7 . 49 5.85 4.3.8 56.2 
6 7.50- 9 . 99 6.1.3 44 . 0 56 . 0 
7 10 . 00- 12 . 49 6 . 54 4.3 . 6 56.4 
8 12.50-14.99 6.70 4.3 . 6 56.4 
9 15.00- 19.99 6 . 91 45 . 1 54. 9 
10 20.00- 24.99 7 . 40 45.1 54.9 
11 25 . 00- 29.99 7.24 44.7 55 • .3 
12 .30.00- .39 . 99 7 . 94 46.1 54 . 0 
i) 50 . 00&above 8 . 75 45.5 55·5 14 all sizes 5 . 20 4.3.7 56 • .3 
uource : Land holding inquiry, 17th round , National Sample Survey, 
beptember, 1961 - July, 1962 . 
A greater proportion of operated area , as seen in 'I'able 2, 
1s taken on lease by the small cultivators, although a substantial 
proportion of the total rented area is operated by large operational 
16 
Ibid. , p. 226. 
12 
holdings. The system of r enting in against a share of produce 
is the most prevalent practice and in small holdings is relatively 
17 
of greate r importance. 
P~RC"NTAG~ OF LEAS~D I N AIlEA UND~R DIFFERENT 1'10D~::' OF TENANCY BY 
u IZ~ OF OPERATIONAL HOLDING, AGRICULTURAL YEAR 1960 - 1961. 
percentage percentage ~ of leased in area reporting tenancy 
holding of operated distribution for for for free on 
s ize area leased of leased fixed fixed shar e of other 
(acres) in in area money produce of r ent terms 
produce 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
.p to 0.99 19 .7 2.3 17.2 4.6 39 . 8 6 . 8 31.6 
.00-2.49 15.9 8 . 3 17.4 14.3 43.7 6.6 18.0 
. 50-4.99 14.0 16 . 3 18.3 14.2 47 . 5 6 . 2 13.8 
.00-9.99 10.2 22.8 21.7 16.4 41.4 4 . 8 15.7 
0.00-14.99 10.6 14 .1 24 . 5 14.7 33 .7 4 . 8 22 . 3 
5.00- 24 . 99 8 . 8 14.0 32 .1 11. 6 35 .1 4 .7 16 .5 
5.00-49.99 8 . 6 14.0 34 . 2 7 . 8 31.0 6 .1 20 . 9 
O.OOP·above 7 . 8 8 . 4 36 . 8 9 . 5 30.2 9.8 13 . 3 
all sizes 10.7 100 . 0 26 . 6 12.9 38 . 7 5 . S 17.5 
u ource: Land holdings inquiry, 17th round, National bample burvey, 
number of sample villages: 3,486. 
The above brings forward the problem of the ultimate unit of 
operation in Indian agriculture . If a parcel is defined as the ul-
timate unit of operation, the data on land holdings show that its 
size is too small, 1.15 a cres on the average , less than one - fifth 
of the holding (6 . 49 a cres ). Even the large holdings are divided 
into extremely small parcels . This parcellization of holdings has 
a connotation differ ent from the fragmentation of the units of 
ownership. Whi l e the latter is a result of the operation of the 
inheritance laws by which the l and . is divided into smaller and 
smaller units, the former is i ndicative of a subdivision of a farming 
unit . Large operators, the data show , have scattered small sized 
parcels and not compact l a r ge p i eces of l and . The exi stence of 
seperat e pieces of land in a large holding only emphaizes the 
17 
Ibid., p . 228- 229. 
13 
complicated manner of tenurial relationships . And the conse -
quences are an inefficient use of the soil which results in 
considerable loss of cultivable aand used for roadways, and 
fences, great difficulti es in water supply anc1 the use of submar-
18 
ginal lRncl. 
A""- the l a::1d holdinz :'.pr:l'i:"~T ShOHS, in Inclia there is "'n 
meven d istri bution of o .. med land, 12 percent of the rural households 
did not have any land, 26 percent 01med belo<", 0.50 acres, 63.5 
percent o"l'med below 5.0 acres. On the other h2nd, 0.60 percent of 
the ho seholds each owning 50 acres or more, owned 11 percent of 
the total owned land. Due to land r eform legislation, the extent 
of landless households has decreased in many s tates, but even 
now as much as 31 percent in Kerala and 24 percent in l"!adras do not 
o.'m any land and the size distribution in many ::>tates has undergone 
19 
very little change. 
These are some of the problems concerning land tenure. The 
following conclusions emerge: (1) a large farm is not a large 
fa.rm in India; (2) the pressure of population is great enough to 
nullify any social objectives in the land reforms; (3) the nucleus 
of large land owners still persists, the security of tenants 
remains for most of the &tates illusive as the operational holding 
is susceptable to frequent changes. 
Jhile industrialization offers considerable benefits of 
dynamic progress , it is essential to recognize the importance of 
agriculture t o deve l opment. Industrialization depends on, the 
surplus that can be tapped from agriculture . horeover , agricultural 
18 
Ibid ., p . 230- 231 . 
19 
Ibi d ., p. 231. 
14-
and rural production can be rapidly raised with little capital 
and a low order of mechanization. There are possibilities of 
doubling crop products, increasing the acreage through irrigation, 
diversion dams, pumps and "Jells, the application of fertilizer 
8,nd improved seed. Underdeveloped agricultural laborers can be 
used for construction of roads, houses and schools. Large returns 
in the agricultural sector are possible with relatively minor 
changes in techniques which the Indian cultivators are willing to 
make, given the suitable incentives. Agriculture is also import-
ant to development because it has a bearing on the balance of 
trade in a country such as India. India ' s balance fluctuates 
largely with changes in its food importation requirements. In 
addition to this, ~ood shortages get more quickly reflected in 
price escalation in underdeveloped rather than in high income 
countries. This is because food is the most important Nage godd 
",hich takes up to 60 percent of total concumption expenditure. 
This results in the institutions of compulsory grain collection, 
price control and rationing which are unfavorable for generating 
development. Jvluch higher returns can be expected from a well 
organized program of raising agricultural output than from 
controlling its distribution. 
If the agricultural sector declines in importance, the 
problem of capital accumulation will be rendered more difficult. 
Anything which raises the productivity of the agricultural sector 
will raise real wages in the industrial sector and since the 
terms of trade generally go against the rural sector, capital 
formation in the industrial sector keeps mounting. Indeed, increased 
rural net cash incomes serves as a stimulus to industrialization. 
Thus, while agriculture is the dominant sector in an underdeveloped 
15 
nation, the economic agruments in favor of developing this sector 
20 
cannot be underestimated. 
It is often stated that India 1s per acre yield of many 
crops is among the lowest in the world, but this by iteself cannot 
lead to the conclusion that Indian agricultural output can either 
be increased rapidly with a few tecbnical innovations or that 
it is inefficient. "It is the opinion of some experts that, given 
the present availability of factors of production and their prices, 
Indian agricultural production is efficient; this contributes to 
21 
maki:ng cllimges so difficult.1l Furthermore, there is evidence 
that Indian peasant farmers are sensitive to price changes that 
effect their output. They respond to new cost- price relationships, 
espeCially with regard to that portion of their output above 
22 
subsistance. 
This raises the question as to whether present incentives in 
Indian agriculture encourage both greater output of agri cultural 
products and an increase in their sale in exchange for manufactured 
products. One of the alternative policies on incentives in the 
agricultural sector is essentially a policy to encourage those 
indi vidual peasant farmers ~vi th the resources and skills to take 
advantage of new techniques and improved prices. However, the 
slowing of output over the past few years raises some questions as 
20 
H.F. Jussawalla, Economics of Development, (Oxford & Ibh 
Publishing Co . , Bombay , 1969) , p . 68 . 
21 
Rosen , George , Democracy and j!;conomic Change in India, (New 
York, Random House, 1971), p. 187 - 188. 
22 . 4 Ib~d ., p. 21 • 
16 
to whether the incentives and the new technology possibilities that 
were provided in the past decade are still sufficient to encourage 
2J 
future growth. 
Higher prices have not been used as an incentive to raise farm 
output for the relationship between higher farm prices and agricultural 
output is a complex one. Within India there has not been a 
conscious a ttempt to use a change in farm prices to encourage farm 
output. At the same time, because of the poor farm output since 
1961, farm prices have risen relative to other prices. Be tween TiJ.arch 
1961 and January 1965, the wholesale rice index of food articles 
rose 40 percent compared with 9 percent for finished manufactured 
24 
goods. The effects of chang ing farm prices upon output will vary 
depending upon the type of polivy adopted . There is also evidence 
that changes in the relationship between the prices of specific inputs 
and the prices of the outputs they contribute to changes i the use 
of these inputs - water, fertilizer, etc. 
However, there is 8. good (]pal of CJ.1)p.Rt ion ."i th respect to the 
effect of changes in relative pricesof feTm products and nonagricultnC'al 
prices as 8. whole . Total farm output in India is still, i"1 lEtrge 
part , dependent upon the monsoon. Thus , c hanging price relationships 
as a whole will have reatively minor effects upon total farm output . 
At the same time , the risky character of Indian agriculture encourages 
speculative withholding and fluctuating farm output prices can 
encourage such withholding either in the hope of higher prices or by 
25 
improving the peasant ' s ability to hold off from selling. 
2J 
Ibid. , p . 215· 
24 
Ibid . , p . 215 · 
25 
Ibi d . , p . 215 . 
17 
For these reasons, the use of price policy is skeptical. 
In urban areas, such a rise in food prices would lead to demands 
for hig her wag es and hig her industrial costs. That could have 
both serious political repercussions in the urban areas and possibly 
harmful to India's competitive industrial position in international 
markets. The effects of such a price movement would also lead to 
a s hift in resources away from the industrial to the a gricultural 
sector. 
This does not mean to say that an improvement in the 
pricing mechanism would not be useful, for it could strengthen the 
stability of the Indian economy. Instability of farm prices probably 
discourag es investment as a source of income. If the government 
were able to reduce risk by stabilizing prices, it would encourag e 
farmers to greater investment and increase in output. Such a 
policy would also call for both widespread construction of public 
grain warehouses and a willingness by the government to buy its 
26 
stocks and sell them to stabilize prices. 
Related to the problem of incentives is the question of 
cooperative farming. However, although voluntary cooperative 
farming would appear to "be a useful institution, its introduction 
in India has faced serious problems. The cooperative farms which 
the government has established have not been successful. There 
is serious doubt whether the peasant farmers could successfully 
cooperate in light of the factionalism that pervades the village 
and the lack of administrative skill necessary to run such a large 
enterprise. Moreover, aside from the political and economic 
questions there is evidence against the economy of scale theory 
26 
Ibid., p. 216. 
18 
27 
often used in favor of cooperative farming. 
In agricultural policy in the past, there 
has been a stalemate between the voal and 
influential advocates of cooperative farm-
and stronger land reforms, and the 
landowners, aprty members and state officals 
who are not vocal but are influential in 
carrying out policy. The former are agalinst 
incentives that would encourage the individual 
peasant; the latter have not been strong 
enough to prevent the adoption of past policy 
statements or to fi ght for an alternative 
national policy, but they have been strong 
enough to prevent the stated policies from 
being implemented . In effect the result is 
conflict and no general policy. Instead policy 
has been a mosaic of bits and piecesm such as 
to discourage investment and greater output and 
to lead to the present agricultural stagnation . 28 
An outstanding factor in Indian a gricultural policy is the 
crucial level of the population. This is a problem which is most 
frustrating, especially to the economies of the underdeveloped 
nations. According to certain projections based on current high 
birth and declining death rates, the population may well double 
29 
itself and reach 800 million by 1985. During the last three decades, 
the annual birth and death rates have fluctuated between 40- 45 and 
26-36 per 1000, respectfully . However, during the last fewyears, 
the general death rate and its components of Infant and Maternal 
Mortality rates have gradually been declining, though the Infant 
Mortality rate is still relatively high - 100 per 1000 live births in 
a year . Be tween 1951- 1956 the death rate was 25 . 9 compared to less 
27 
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19 
than 10.0 in the United s tates. But the death rate is falling 
30 
and is expected to be at 12.5 by 1972. HO\'lever, the birth rate 
is not declining proportionately with the death rate. Some of the 
reasons for the high birth rate are - (1) nearly everyone above 
the age of consent is actually married . It is a quasi-religious 
duty in India to ge t married. As an individual's economic 
security is seldom a prerequisite to marriage, and there is no 
individual choice in one ' s selection of a wife or husband, there 
is no economic or emotional deterrent to marriage. (2) harriages 
are at an early age. (3) There are increaing numbers of men who 
are willing to marry eligible widows. 'llhis is contributing to the 
population problem. (4) There is the absense of any effective 
and widespread family planning habit among the rural population 
who constitutes some 80 percent of the total population. 
ll'he crux of the problem facing Indian planners is how to 
achieve higher levels of living standards and reduce the d.eath 
rate, when the economy is unable to support the existing population 
even at the present low level of living , if at the same time the 
population continues to increase by about eight mi llion persons 
every year? In other words, as the draft of the Third Five- Year 
Plan (1961 -1 966) sums up the situation : 
30 
In an economy with low levels of · income 
and consumption, high rates of popUlation 
growth severely limit the pace of economic 
development. They increase the requirements 
of consumption and the difficulty of providing 
productive employment for the growing labor 
force. If the long- term aims concerning 
per capita income and the reduction in 
the proportion of popul"~;.('ln ce'Tlend.ent on 
93riculture are to .~ r~l:ized , the effort 
by way of capital accumulation has to be 
substantially increased. The objective of 
stabilizing the population has cers.tinly 
Ibid., p. 262. 
to be regarded as an essential 
element in the srategy of 
development.31 
20 
The population problem has serious consequences for Indian 
development. Firstly , this overpopulation has made it difficult 
to erase the poverty and IO~T levels of living which is experienced 
by the majority of the Indian peoples. Secondly, India ' s population 
is relatively young from the standpoint of age and composition and 
it has inherent potentialities for increasing the annual additions 
to the already high number of citizens. The problem of rearing and 
caring for a disproportionate large percentage of young people ~Tho 
are not and cannot be gainfully employed, rests upon the relatively 
small proportion of the gainfully employed. This situation is bound 
to lead to considerable economic and social distress. 
And lastly, a major objective of planned economic development 
is to create full employment. It is true that full employment is 
also the product of such development. But the present annual rate 
of population growth , ranging between 1.8 and 2 . 0 percent, worsens 
the employment, or rather the unemployment situation by stepping up 
the number of entnmts to the labor force to the extent of something 
nearing 15 million in the next five years. It is unlikely that the 
Indian economy Nill create a sufficient number of jobs to absorb 
32 
these additional numbers into he labor force. 
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Inevitably we are led to the only 
possible solution - the establishment 
of a socialist order, first within 
national bourdaries ••• with a control-
production and distribution of wealth 
for the public good ••• (This) can 
hardly take place without the willing 
cons~at or acquiescence of the great 
majority of the people concerned. 
Is it desirable or possible for us 
to stop the functioning of big-scale 
machinery in our country? • • It is 
obvious that Ne cannot do so. If 
we have railways, bridges, transport 
facilities, etc ., we must produce 
them ourselves or depend on others. 
If we want to have the means of 
defense >,Ie must not only have the 
basic industries but a highly 
developed industrial system. No 
country today is really independent 
or resisting agression unless it is 
industrially developed . The cooper-
ative principle should be applied to 
the exploitation of land by developing 
collective and cooperative farms. It 
was not proposed, h01'lever, to rule 
out peasant farming in small holdings 
•.. but no intermediaries of the type 
of the talukdars , zamindars, etc. 
should be recognized after the transition 
period was over • •• Banks, insurance, etc . 
should at least be under the control 
of the s tate, thus leading to a state 
regulation of capital and credit . It 
was also desirable to control the 
export and import trade.)) 
(The Plan) was inevitably leading us 
to>'Iards establishing some of the 
fundamentals of the socialist structure. 
It was limiting the acquisitive factor 
in society, removing many of the 
barriers to growth, and thus leading to 
a rapidly expanding social structure. 
It was based on planning for the benefit 
of the common man, raising his standards 
21 
Jawaharial Nehru, An Autobiography, (Bodley Head , London , 
195)), pp . 52), 526 . 
greatly , g~v~ng him opportunities 
of growth, and releasing an enormous 
amount of latent talent and capacity. 
And all this was to be attempted in the 
context of democraric freedom and with 
a large measure of cooperation of some 
at least of the groups who were normally 
opposed to socialistic doctrine . That 
cooperation seemed to me worthwhile 
even if it involved toning do~m or 
weakening the plan in some respects. 34 
22 
Policy makers in India describe their economic system as 
democratic socialism, or development under democratic but centralized 
control. In this framework, they state, the criterion for deter-
mining economic policy is what is good for the community as a whole. 
Although India calls herself a socialistic nation , the United 
States is much more socialistic than India in terms of the 
percentage of product spend by the government and the government 1s 
35 
overall direction of the economy. 
The main goals of Indian planning include the following -
(1) to increase per capita income, primarily by raising total 
output, (2) to place Indian growth on a self - sustaining basis is 
no longer so heavily dependent on fluctuations in agricultuEal 
output, which in turn depends so greatly on the vagaries of the 
annual monsoon , to make the Indian economy and its development less 
dependent on a fe\'J raw materials and traditional exports, which 
are subject to world market price fluctuations; and yet, at the 
same time, to make India eventually independent of foreign aid, 
34 
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which would contribute in turn to its freedom in foreign policy 
and its political independence, (4) in this process to provide 
increased employment for the unemployed and underemployed, (5) 
to diminish the inequalities in income and status among persons 
36 
and regions. 
Economic planning has put several demands on Indian agri -
culture. The success and failure of agricultural policy will 
be based, in part , on meeting these demands . First of all, it 
must contribute to the political and economic democracy of the 
37 
nation . In India, nationalism raises the horizons beyond 
the family and. caste and province . vIi th India being predominantly 
a rural nation having three - forths of its population classified 
as rural, regionalism and diverse tendencies are strong. Thus, 
the objective is to develop wide local participation in political 
and economic processes . But, for this to occur , it is necessary 
to significantly develop the local governmental bodies . Varying 
social and economic conditions also requires a tailoring of 
development efforts to meet local requirements and vitiates 
38 
centralized government . It is i mportant to note that progress 
in this area has been slowed by a conflict between national 
political philosophy favorable to development and the self - interest 
39 
of the ~overning bureaucracy. 
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Indian agriculture must also provide employment for a grow-
ing population . Expanding employment is a prime means of raising 
per capita incomes for the amount of employment is i mportant in 
40 
determining the breadth of income distribution. In the long 
run, the Indian unemployment problem is more serious than the 
shortage of food supplies. Even though pressure on land resources 
has increased, the rate of population growth has accelerated. 
Moreover, the death rate will decline with India ' s success in 
raising the availability of food and raising the living conditions . 
The Indian agarian sector must also provide for the expanding 
agricultural employment which will develop. Within the context 
of traditional agriculture with diminishing returns to increments 
of labor and capital, the distribution of population with three -
fourths of the population found in the rural areas is, in the 
42 
short run, a major failure of Indian economic development. 
The proportion between rural and urban population has stayed the 
same over the first three five-year plans. From 1949-50 to 
1964-64, over one -half of the additional agricultural labor was 
absorbed on increased a creage of irrigated and unirrigated land. 
The remainder was absorbed by increased intensive farming which 
brought about a r eturn of about 15 cents for each added day of 
labor. Major technical changes in Indian agriculture may increase 
labor requirements as well as raise yields per acre. Additional 
40 
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25 
opportunity for absorbing a growing labor force is pro-
vided by the structure of modern agriculture including improved 
roads, education, cooperative marketing and supplying organi-
43 
zations. Any policy oriented towards employment must also 
necessarily include efforts to increase agricultural production. 
Likewise, there is a close relationship between employment-
44 
oriented policy and food aid. 
A rural public works program could play an important role 
in increasing efficient rural employment . The effective 
implementation of a successful rural public works program has 
four reuirements: (1) finanCing of labor force; (2) complementary 
physical resourees; (3) technical know-how; (4) administrative 
structure. 
Indian agriculture plays a key role in expanding the urban 
employment sector. Without a doubt , the major burden for providing 
employment must fallon the uroan sector . However, urban 
employment requires vast inputs not only of direct inveestment 
in production facilities, but also for investment in housing and 
other urban necessities. 
The three major sources of capital for industrial development 
are (1) foreign aid ; (2) foreign private investment; (3) and 
domestic savings. Aericulture ~ust be a prime source of savings. 
Thus it is agriculture which must provide greater employment , 
either within itself or by providing capital to create nonfarm 
jobs. 
43 
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jobs. 
The prices at which agricultural commodities are exchanged 
for urban goods largely determine the rate of savings and invest-
ment in the urban sector. Food prices are the most important 
part of the cost of living for the working class, and they 
determine the level of money wages. If food prices are low as a 
result of high agricultural production, money wages can be low; 
consequently the level of profit will tend to be high, providing 
a fund for savings and investment in industrial expansion. During 
the first year plans, agricultural prices fluctuated substantially, 
but around a flat trend line. Over this period, changes in the 
relative price of agricultural commodities neither fostered nor 
45 
inhibited industrial development . 
High taxes on agriculture can enable a government to finance 
the transfere of agricultural commodities to other sectors. 
India has low taxes on agriculturists: during 1961- 61 all taxes 
on agriculturalists took less than 6 percent of agricultural 
46 
income. The tax burden on the upper- income farmer (about 7 
percent of income) is only slightly higher than the average tax 
for agriculturists. It is lower than the tax rate - about 18 
percent of income - for people in the same bracket in non-
47 
agricultural sectors. For the upper income agriculturists , land 
taxes comprise only about 20 percent of the tax burden and indirect 
48 
taxes make up the bulk of the remainder. 
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Any across - the - board increase in the tax on the agricultural 
sector will bear heavily on 10\'1er- income agricu1 turists, and 
for that reason will probably not be a.cceptable. Thus a major 
increa se in the bu"""~'" '):" ",2 yeS or the agricultural sector 
would almost certainly be associated with a reform of the tax 
structure so that the burden is more fully borne by upper-
49 
income rural people. 
With respect to direct taxation, there is little reason to 
believe that the proportionate burden borne by agriculture has 
increased over the past decade ; it has more likely decreased 
since , of the main direct taxes, neither the land revenue payments, 
which include payments formerly made to intermediaries in the 
early years, nor the agricultural income tax have sho~m sub-
50 
stantia.l increase. The main direct tax on agriculture, the 
land revenue tax, which has not been adjusted since the war, 
declined from 4 . 5 percent of the net value of agricultural output 
in 1938- 39 to less than 2 percent of net agricultural output 
51 
in 1960- 61. 
Although some states have agricultural income taxes, these 
have many defects and their extension has not been advocated. 
As a. result, Ashok J.Jitra concludes that in the 1950-58 period , 
while per capita agricultural income averaged about 40 percent 
of nonagricultural income, the per capita tax paid by the 
agricultural population was only about 12 percent of that paid 
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by the nonagricultural sector . 
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There have been many suggestions on how to raise the land 
revenue payments of the peasants and to introduce an element of 
progression into the system by relati~~ payments to the size of 
th farm, but none have been adopted. In the budget proposals 
of the years 1963-64, the central government proposed a compulsory 
deposit scheme under which those peasants paying land revenue 
would be required to deposit with the government offices a sum 
equal to 50 percent of the land revenue they paid in 1959-60, or 
half of the average land revenue of Rs 3 per acre . The proceeds 
of this compulsory deposit would have gone to the states. However, 
this indirect proposal to tap a major potential source of 
additional revenue was withdrawn after protests from the states. 
This withdrawal is an indication of the power of the peasat 
groups in both the state and national Congress parties. 
With a tax policy that results in 
taxes lagging behind expenditures 
in the agricultural sector , there 
has been a steady flow of resources 
through the government from the 
nonagricultural to the agricultural 
sectors. Under such circumstances 
it is not surprising that the shift 
in the structure of the Indian 
economy from agricultur to non-
agriculture has been l~gging behind 
both hopes and plans. 5 
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Providing an increasing quantity of food is another important 
'-,-lit 
demand placed on the Indian economy. Increasing the productivity 
per capita of its population constitutes the basic task of 
the Indian economy . There are two related reasons why ,it is 
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sensible for India to place particular emphasis on raising 
incomes through increased agricultural production. First, rapid 
gro th in the demand for food creates a favorable economic 
environment for expanding agricultural production. Equally 
important, India has a natural resource base in agriculture 
which provides clear potential for raid increase in production 
55 
and high rates of return to the necessry investment. 
The argument against agricultural development is that over 
a period of time, the prices of agricultural commodities will 
tend downward in relation to nonagricultural commodities, thus 
favoring production of industrial products. This is a silly 
assumption. The Indian demand for agricultural commodities 
is potentially so great that the inability of India to meet the 
bulk of its agricultural production needs through domestic 
56 
production would eventually raise world agricultural prices. 
Although in the past, population has been the prime factor 
in growth of demand for food, rising per capita incomes are 
playing an increasingly significant role. The importance of 
income in determining demand for food suggests that the agricultural 
sector will continue to playa strong and positive rolw in 
Indian development even if a solution is found to the population 
57 
problem. Indeed, slower population growth will increase the 
per capita demand for food, since one of the prime effects of a 
decrease in the rate of population growth will be to increase 
55 
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per capita income. Higher income will also sharply increase 
the demand for food. Gro .. tth in per capita income also increases 
the demand for what might be termed luxury commodities, such 
as livestock products, fruits, and vegetables , much more than 
it increases the demand for grain . 
Rising incomes increase the demand most for commodities 
such as milk, eggs , vegetables and fruits that provide a large 
value of output per acre of land and require a large labor 
input. These commodities are particularly .. tell sui ted to the 
resources available to Indian agriculture. Despite this potential, 
however, the Indian economy has apparently been less effective 
in increasing production of these commodities than of the 
basic food grains , and the prices of milk , vegetables, and 
similar products have consequently risen much more then prices 
58 
of food grains. ~mall changes in prices for these commodities 
cause substantial shifts in consumption. The price differences 
indicate a major failure in meeting demand. This failurec is 
probably due to a lack of concern for agriculture, to the les ser 
aggregate importanc p of these co~odities ~no the lpck of political 
pressure from risin£, prices, and to the particularly difficult 
59 
problems of marketing and producing many of these commodities. 
As a result, a major potential of contribution to income gener-
ation ha.s not been used. ~olving the production and marketing 
problems for such commodities will become more important as 
rising per capita income increases the proportion of the total 
58 
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demand for food that is compri sed by demand for these commodities. 
To asurprising extent, increased agricultural production 
in India creates its own demand. This tendency can be reinforced 
if increased agricultural production encourages greater employ-
ment of low income laborers . Thus, increased employment and 
better welfare would maintain upward pressure on food prices . As 
a consequence, agricul tural success "\Irould appear to be a failure; 
there would be continuing political and economic pressures for 
food aid , even though Indian agricultural production were increasing 
rapidly . A program of steady achievement in agricultural develop-
Irlent will not end either the pressures on India I s agriculture or 
the need fo~ c continued development and contribution from rural 
60 
India. 
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INDIAN PLANNING -
THE THREE FIVE- YEAR PLANS 
}2 
Through the first three plan periods, Indian agriculture 
succeeded in meeting roughly the growth in demand for food and 
in absorbing about three-fourths of the growth in demand for 
food and in having absorbed labor only at declining levels of 
productivity, hence lowering real income, and in contributing 
nothing to the formation of jobs in the nonagricultural sector. 
As a result a failure to increase productivity and to contribute 
to increasing incomes in the economy, agriculture did not con-
tribute to a more equitable distribution of income, particularly 
61 
with reference to the landless laborer. 
The success of Indian agriculture was achieved largely 
without the benefit of major technological change. Prior to 
1961, the production increase resulted from expansion of the 
total land area and of the area under irrigation , and from 
increased labor. New crop varieties, new agronomic practices, 
and inorganic fertilizers played a modest role during this 
period . The faster rates of growth upon which other objectives 
of development depend can only be achieved through technological 
change. With better technology production may be increased at 
the same time that incomes and returns to factors of production 
62 
are increased. 
There are four prerequisites to technological change in 
agriculture: (1) an incentive system that encourages acceptance 
of innovation; (2) a set of improved production processes created 
for local conditions; (}) an educational system to teach farmers 
, 
how to choose and adapt technology to specific conditions; (4) 
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efficient supply to farmers of the added inputs in which 
63 
technological change is embodied. 
33 
India has controlled its economic development by means of 
a series of five - year plans that began in 1951. The device was 
borrowed from the Soviet Union by the late Prime Minister 
Jawaharial Nehru who hoped to achieve for India an, economic 
growth similar to that of the USSR. Each plan stipulates a 
series of investment and production targets . Industrial expansion 
is stressed and agriculture and manpower are given low priority. 
This relative emphasis reflects an early view of economic growth 
that held as a nation progressively raises its industrial 
investment, a point is reached where grwoth becomes "pervasive 
64 
and self - sustaining." The Indian planners concede that low 
productivity, the high proportion of the population in agriculture 
and large- scale unemployment are deterrents to growth. They 
believe, however, that these factors will be responsive to a 
policy designed to raise investment to about 17 percent of the 
65 
national income . 
In the First Five - Year Plan, the government 1s objective 
was to raise the living standards of the Indian people. The 
planning document states: 
63 
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The central objective of planning 
in India at the present stage is 
to initiate a process of develop-
ment which will raise living stand-
ards and open up to the people new 
Ibid . , p. 30 . 
Raellaele, p. 188. 
Ibid . , p. 188. 
opportunities for a r~cher 
and more varied life. 6 
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The First Five - Year Plan (1951 - 1956) was no plan at all. 
It recognized the prime necessity of continuing to consolidate 
the nation into a political whole, of beginning to build an 
economic as well as political democracy by turning attention to 
social- welfare objectives, and of beginning to expand the income 
base. lilt emphasized what ''las the easiest to emphasize and did 
67 
what was easiest to do." The deficiencies of the plan - how 
little of value economics had to contribute about the processes 
of building an economy from a base like that of India - was not 
evident at the time. "The Planning Commission embarked upon a 
program of planned and facilitated development long before 
68 
planning tools and underlying knowledge ",ere at hand." 
The characteristics of the First Five- Year Plan were as 
fol101'<8 - (1) it assumed that landowners, moneylenders, and traders 
iOn agricultural commodities severely exploited agriculturalists; 
(2) it assumed that agriculturalists were basically ignorant 
people who continued to farm in a backward and unproductive 
manner; (3) although it recognized that agricultural production 
was also dependent on inputs, and that among these, water was 
particularly important ; there ",as little understanding of the 
69 
role of technological change or of its conditions . Remedies to 
the problem of exploitation lay in land reform and abolition and 
provision of alternative means of marketing agricultural commodities. 
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To alleviate backwardness, carrying of information concerning 
improved methods to farmers , programs of social welfare to gain 
the confidence of cultivators, and literacy programs to increase 
the level of education. 
The problem of inputs was attacked through major investment 
in irrigati on facilities which made up 16 percent of the first 
70 
plan expenditure. IH th India I s shortage of administrative and 
organizational manpower, plus lack of basic knowledge both of 
the agr icul tural sector and how it should be developed. large - scale 
71 
multi - purpose irrigation projects seemed the most sensible choice . 
The Community Development Program was the most ambitious 
and exciting feature of the First Five- Year Plan . It was not 
oriented purely towards developing agricultural production. Its 
basic design was intended to change the attitudes and outlook of 
the rural population . H01"leVer , much of the decisions regarding the 
Community Development Program vvere based on an incorrect appraisal 
of village attitudes and the prerequistes of agricultural 
72 
development . It offered literacy classes, better supply of 
drinking water, community centers , cooperative organizations . 
youth programs, improved roads , new local governmental bodies . 
and better seeds , tools . and farming practices. The program reached 
73 
123.000 villages and 80 million persons . 
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The basic unit of the Community Development Program was 
the Community Development Block (100 villages and 60,000 to 
70,000 persons) . It coordinated an administration which treated 
the needs of village development. The Block Development Officer 
directed the hierarchy of technical specialists and village-
level workers. In practice, however , he "I',as a general adminis -
trator. The Technical Specialists "rere heavily burdened with 
administrative chores. Their time was spent more with facilitat-
ing loans and subsidy assistance than extending technical 
knowledge. The function of the village-level worker was to set 
up field demonstrations, to iniate talks and group discussions, 
to investigate villagers ' needs, to awaken concern, and to 
carry out programs developed by the technical specialists. They 
lacked formal education and knowledge necessary to understand 
new technology and the degree of respect they generated from the 
74 
villagers varied from village to village. 
The structure of the Community Development Program created 
the tendency for administrative structure to form a line 
organization which unfortunately further isolated the higher 
order of competence in the Community Block from the farmer. The 
concept of the Block and village- level worker were clearly 
75 
"visionary ." 'I'here was a general tendency to operate the 
Community Development Program as an entity, seperate from the 
rest of the state ' s program in agriculture. One of the few 
soldis bodies of technical competence, the British system of 
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district agricultural officers , was seperated from the major 
76 
rural development effort. 
In theory, each state ! s development commissioner appointed 
Block administrative staffs and the village - level workers and 
was also expected to coordinate Block activities with the state ! s 
technical departments. The district collector, the key admin-
istrative head at the district level, was responsible for 
corrdinating all activities in the district, including the 
CDP Blocks . In practice such coordination did not extend far, 
77 
and the Blcocks operated mostly as seperate structures. 
The Blocks were generally isolated from sources of technical 
advice . There was no clear tie with agricultural experiment 
stations . There was further complication by the procedures for 
promoting Block personnel. Promotions were gained by impressing 
distant administrators . The bureaucratization of the system 
and the time spent in routine administration and report- iITiting 
cannot be stressed too much . Also frequent traasfere of personnel 
78 
made it difficult to discover the villagers ! needs and desires. 
Criticism of the Community Development Program include the 
following - (1) did not place enough emphasis on increasing 
agricultural production; (2) expanded too rapidly at the expense 
of quality; (3) it was divorced from research and from the old 
agricultural extension program , thereby losing contact with the 
district agricultural officers and with the technical competence 
that did exist ; (4) the administrative structure was such that the 
76 
Ibid., p. 38 . 
77 
Ibid . , p . 38. 
78 
Ibid. , p. 38 . 
38 
government gave orders to be filtered out to farmers through 
a complex bureaucracy which received little influence or guidance 
79 
from the farmers themselves. Valid criticism of Indian 
agricultural developmental planning in the First plan period 
focuses not s o much on the a lloca tion of Community Deve lopment 
resources as on the failure to see what was missing and to build 
a base for supplying those missing elements. No effort was 
made to expand agricultural research or to increase technical 
competence or extension a gents. The action programs were probable 
consistent with the needs and resources of the moment , but the 
total plan did not confront the necessity of changing the 
environment in order to facilitate quite different programming 
80 
in the future . 
It is easy to argue the failure of the Community Development 
Program but it is difficult to formulate a better alternative 
for the India of 1951. The massive effort encouraged a constant 
concern and attention for the rural sector which would otherwise 
have been absent in a government d~minated by intellectuals 
concerned much more with industrial than with rural development . 
Likewise , the application of a widespread administrative structure 
to rural problems generated pressures for reform and for development 
81 
of a much useful institutional framework. 
I r rigation played an important part in the First Plan period. 
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~xpanded irrigation facilities accounted for more than one -
fifth of the real or weather- adjusted production increase of 
the First Plan period. The growth of population and the 
consequent pressure to move into marginal lands have expanded 
the land acreage , and have thereby proved to be more important 
factors in increasing agricultural production than has investment 
in irrigation . 
Irrigation received major emphasis in the First Plan because 
water plays such an important role in Indian agriculture and 
because the types of administrative and capital resources required 
for irrigation were abundant at the time the First Flan was framed. 
The natural desire of farmers to reduce the risk and the tradition-
ally low price of irrigation water provided an obvious basis for 
India to emphasize irrigation in the First Plan . This was 
reinforced by the suitability of large- scale irrigation projects 
to an economy which has large sources of unskilled labor, an 
exceedingly short supply of industrial capital, and a scarcity 
of administrative resources for planning and executing industrial 
83 
plants or complex agricultural schemes. An additional factor 
which supported the adoption of large - scale projects in the First 
Plan was the need for tangible monuments of achievement in the 
neN nation. Bhakra Dam, 740 feet hip:h, dramatized the pm-fer of 
84 
the ne\,T government . 
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40 
Irrigation has been an imuortant contribution to increasing 
Indian agricultural production because of the heavy expenditures 
made for it, and not because these expenditures were efficiently 
used, for they afforded a high rate of return. The rate of return 
to irr igation has generally been small in both physical and 
monetary terms. The investment in irrigation should make a 10 
to 20 percent return and increase production 2 to 3 fold, actually 
it has afforded a 4 percent r eturn i'lith 50 percent increase in 
production . Hi gh rates of return depend on the development of 
research and other institutions which \<rere ineffective at the time 
85 
of the First Plan. Returns to irrigation were often lm'J"ered 
further because new facilities could not be used to full capacity 
by farmers which had not prepared their field channels . Inadequate 
preparation of the land is also a difficulty, for itf the fields 
are not level, there is poor distribution of ''later and full 
bebefit from irrigation is lost. As a result farmers have often 
found "rater use and conservation unprofitable, either due to lac''.~ 
of complementary crops, fertilizer, and farming practices or because 
poor distribution systems provided so much water per field that 
86 
the returns to the final increments of water were very low . 
I'.ajor criticisms of the Indian irrigation policy - (1) too 
much attention has been given to famine relief and not to intensive 
development of agriculture; (2) total investment in irrip:ation he.s 
been insufficient ; (3) management of irrigation systems has been 
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poor, resulting in part from the division of authority between 
the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the Hinistry of Irrigation 
and Power; (4) irrigation development (particularly in regard to 
new facilities) has not been corrdinated with increased input 
of fertilizer and exteLsion s e r vices ; (5) there has not been 
87 
enough research for irrigation. 
The problem of removing exploitation from the agricultural 
sector was also tackled under the First Five Year Plan. In 
discussing the success and/or failure of policy under this 
program it is necessary to determine three things - to what extent 
does exploitation actually oocur; to what extent of any exploit-
ation which did occur actually affected agricultural production; 
and to what extent , .. ere goverflJO.ent policies effec ti ve. 
At the time of independence, the zamindari and the yrotwari 
were the two dominant systems of land tenure . The latter is 
generally described as a peas~t-proprietor or small- holder system; 
the former was in essence a feudal landlord- tenant system. One of 
the prime policies of the All - India Congress was to eliminate 
intermediaries between the cultivator and the government. After 
independence , a major and largely successful effort was made to 
implement this policy , and the , Feport of the 1948 Agarian Reform 
Committee of the Congress established a basis for subsequent 
legislation . Reform legislation attempted to eliminate all 
intermediaries including the zamindars , and to protect by suitable 
regulation the tenants who might remain . 
The whole problem of land- tenure reform has been greatly 
complicated in India not only by the multiplicity of systems 
existing at the same time, but also by the provision that land-
87 
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tenure legislation was to be left to the states. Zamindari 
abolition hoped that it would be accomplished (a) under the 
new constitution, which protected property rights (b) with 
compensation to the former zamindars and (c) with ample protection 
for the right of the zamindars themselves to resume personal 
88 
cultivation on land previously let to tenants. 
In regard to regulation of tenancy , Indian land reform has 
been much less successful. The basic reason lies in the fact that 
since land is so important in making a living, the landowner 
necessarily has great power over the tenant . When there is no 
alternative for a tenant, he can be prevented from even appealing 
to the protection of the law. Huch renting tends to be IIsub-
89 
rosa" and short- termed, hence difficult to regulate . 
According to Indian economist Ali Khusro , 75 percent of 
Indian agriculture is now based on essentially peasant systems. 
Under these systems the land is divided into holdings of a size 
which provides, under existing technology , a full - time job for 
the farm family. The family suppli es the labor, makes the basi c 
decisions , and reaps the primary benefits . The remaining 25 
90 
percent of land is still under various systems of tenure . 
A full appraisal of Indian land reform must take into 
consideration (a) the extent of one man l s arbitrary power over 
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another (b) the efficiency and level of agricultural production 
(c) the distribution of income (d) the distribution of political 
p01ver . The zamindari system gave the zamindars great power over 
their tenants . \O[ith such a large amount of illiterate tenants, 
abolition has allowed new exploiters to enter the vacuum. Also, 
from a base of greater than average economic pOler and education , 
the zamindari landowners continue to dominate most political 
91 
positions. 
From the teoretical side, lithe First Five- Year Plan 1vas, 
essentially a collection of several projections and contained a 
Harrod- Domar type exercise which sought to examine growth rates 
that would be achieved by specification of feasible marginal 
92 
savings rate and a resulting average savings ratio. 1I The model 
was not given an explicit analytical form, but was implicit in 
numerical figures which constituted a perspective plan for 
developing the Indian econom . It was essentiaaly a simple variant 
of the Harrod- Domar model. The sole modification, but a crucial 
one nevertheless, was the distinction bet.Jeen average and 
93 
marginal propensities to save. The canital- output ratio was 
assumed the same on the margin as well as on the average. 
The model 1-Jas essentially developed for a closed economy 
1'1i th the followin.a: basic equations underlyinp: growth -
(1) I 
t 
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All equations except (2) are the same as the Harrod- Domar model. 
Equation (2) introduces the distinction between marginal and awpraee 
propensities to save . The model leads to the basic differential 
equation K act K b which can be solved to give a time 
t t 
profile of capital stock and output: 
(5) K 
t 
(K 
o 
a t ck 
b/a ~)e + b/a"" 
Unlike the harrod- Domar model , growth rises from period to pe riod 
(provided a ..., ::; / Y ). An economy saving more on the margin than 
o 0 
on the average can do better over time in terms of the rate of 
growt h . 
This model is useful in indicating t he basic macro - economic 
features that a more elaborate system would equally satisify. It 
serves as a simple mechanism for computing external assis tance that 
may be necessary for supplementing domes tic savings to sustain the 
projected rate in income . 
The Harrod-Domar model, however, obscures some problems of 
importance . Concentration of the flo,'! equilibrium and implicit 
assumptions that there are no structural difficulties in trans -
formin~ savings into investment may i gnore the real constraints 
in the economy . With the framework of assumptions, the model 
ignores the fundamental choice of planning over time which 
reQuires a weighing of present versus future gains by assumi ng 
a constant marginal propensity to save for the economy as a 
94 
whole . 
It appears that the selection of 
projects by governmental expenditure 
reflected essentially the 1I0verhead-
Capital ll approach to developmental 
planning and the model was largely an 
intellectual appendage "lith little 
imoact on actual formation of the 
First Five - Year Plan . 9.5 
4.5 
The ;:;econd Five - Year Plan (19.56-1961) "las essentially a 
continuation of the agricultural program carried out under the 
First Plan . It was not until late in the Second Plan that planners 
began to ask serious questions about agricultural development . 
The program was organized with the Community Jevelopment Program 
expanded to country-wide coverage. Hore attention was given to 
minor irrigation schemes. Concern about the exploitation of farmers 
continued \'lith more attention given to circumventing moneylenders 
and traders by cooperatives and regulation. The emphasis on 
cooperati ve farming reflected the increased concern \,li th the 
farm structure as the abolition of intermediaries ''las believed not 
96 
to have solved the land tenure problems adequately. 
Any discussion of the Second Five- Year Plan falls into two 
parts: (a) policies and programs v,hich '-1ere logical outgrowths of 
the First Plan - (1) moneylenders and credit cooperatives; (2) 
traders and service cooperatives; (3) farm structure including 
cooperatives and consolidation; (4) development of panchayats; 
and (b) rising criticism of agricultural developmental planning 
"lhich has provided a basis for the experimentation of the Third 
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Plano 
At the beginning of the First Plan it was recognized that 
an adequate solution to the credit problem had not been found 
and the All- India Rural Credit Survey ~'ias initiated in 1951. The 
report of the survey was issued in 1954 and showed that credit 
societies had not provided widespread alternatives to the money-
lenders and it formed the basis for future positive efforts in 
97 
the credit field . 
In moneylending, the problem was poorly diagnosed. 1m 
general, the peasant cultivators responsible for the bulk of 
production were not in the grasp of the moneylenders and were 
not held back from production by lack of credit. The literature 
of protest against the moneylenders was not based on fact, for 
those exploited represented a small minority of the poorest and 
economically weakest in the society . Loans to these groups were 
basically consumer loans required to maintain a low standard of 
livi~. ~he basic problem was not exploitation by moneylenders, 
98 
that Nas a symptom, the problem was poverty. 
I'.oreover , the moneylender sys tem seems quite eff icient. 
~here appears to be relatively free entry into moneylending 
and this keeps rates in line with costs . Thus , competition 
99 
l i mits abuses. 
The cooperative credit programs failed initially because they 
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had stepped into a situation where there was competition among 
efficient private operators who possessed great knowledge of the 
community and who operated in a highly flexible manner. The 
bureaucratic governmental agency was poorly suited for handling 
consumer credit to the economically poorest groups who are least 
likely to repay. Lending for purposes of increased production and 
providing increased income to facilitate repayment are the 
areas where the cooperatives have the greatest advantage. To 
be able to compete in making such loans, cooperatives must become 
more flexible in timing and terms of the loan and they must min-
imize bureaucratic red tape . Another important requirement is 
the provision of sound possibilities for profitable investment 
in new technology. The relative growth in importance of cooperative 
100 
credit has been associated with improving technology. 
If trading and service cooperatives are to be successful 
under existing conditions, they must be highly efficient and 
preferably should offer additional services. In general, marketing 
and supply cooperatives have not been successful in India . Not 
only have they attemped to compete in situations where the 
average margins are thin, but also they have been hampered by 
bureaucracy which has lessened their efficiency and flexibility . 
Rather than render better service , thay have all too often rendered 
worse. There are, however, some outstanding exceptions including 
the Kaira District Milk Cooperative, a number of sugar, oilseed , 
and cotton- making cooperatives. Successful cooperatives' operate 
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outside the governmental bureaucracy, enjoy first-class admin-
istrative imagination and leadership, and have offered special 
101 
s ervices. 
The key to providing services which farmers desire is 
efficient management and sufficient decentralization of authority 
to allow the management to use its skills and abilities. Once 
good training programs are established, local boards of directors 
or advisors should be set up for two purposes: (1) to advise 
cooperative managers of local problems and provide background 
knowledge; and (2) to provide a basis for local responsibility. 
Far too little progress has been made in recognizing the problem 
of competing with private trade, of training competent management, 
102 
and of shifting real authority to the local level. 
Concerning land tenure and farm structure, the Se cond Plan 
asserts that tiThe main task during the plan is to take such 
essential steps as will provide sound foundations for the development 
of cooperative farmin~ so that over a period of ten years or so 
a substantial proportion of agriculural lands are ?ultivated on 
103 
cooperative lines." The problem lies in that there have never 
been guidelines for and effective administrative action aimed at 
spreading cooperative farming. 
There is a credible case for expecting economies to accrue 
from consolidation of Indian farms. Average Indian farms consist 
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of five acres or so. Most agricultural production in India 
takes place on farms which make relative use of the family 
labor force, at least at seasonal peaks. Joint farming offers 
no basis for greater efficieny. There are propects for efficiency 
from farmers with small holdings . The common error in appraising 
the question of scale is to confuse it with the man- land ratio . 
Pooling both the land and the family labor forces of many farmers 
cannot add significantly to the amount of land per family. 
In a study on relative efficiency of Indian agriculture 
conducted by Lawrence J. Lavand Pan A. Yotopoulos,"the conclusion 
resulted in favor of small farms (less than 10 acres). It 
appears that, given the fixed factors of production (land and 
fixed capital) and within the ranges of the observed prices of 
output and variable inputs (labor), the small farms have higher 
104 
actual profits." In the context of analysis, this finding 
means "that the small farms attain higher levels of price 
efficiency and/or they operate at higher levels of technical 
efficiency. They may imply that in agriculture the supervisory 
role of the owner- manager of the farm may be crucial for attaining 
high levels of economic efficiency. This test 1rwuld draw limits 
105 
of supervisory capacity at 10 acres." 
Indian experience with cooperative farming illustrates 
several important factors about Indian development and execution: 
104 
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(1) it is sensitive to political processes and to social - welfare 
considerations. Economists and planners never appeared to be 
very enthusiastic about cooperatives because they recognized the 
economic pitfalls . The enthusiasm of politicans was based on 
lIa heavy weighing of social - welfare factors, a misreading of the 
economy, and the recognition that cooperative farming was 
106 
consistent with the current political doctrine." (2) it 
107 
illustrates the pragmatism of Indian politics . 
The land consolidation program of the becond Plan illustrates 
the problems of executi~~ agricultural development programs in 
India: (1) it has not had political appeal as it is not dramatic; 
(2) it must be decentralized in orde r to utilize local knowledge 
of land quality and rights; ()) it requires a large number of 
administrators; (4) and it suffered from widespread stories of 
~ 108 
corruption . 
Due to t he varied phys ical, economic, and cultural conditions 
in India, there is a valid criticism for local modification and 
administration of plans . Much failure in rural development can 
be attributed to a lack of a strong local political base from 
which knowledge of local conditions and problems can be gained . 
The Bahrantray I.ehta Committee in 1957 stressed the need for 
greater pO"l'mr and responsibility with the districts and above 
109 
the village level if rural local government was to be effective. 
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A Three - tiered structure has developed - the village panchayat 
is elected directly by the village electorate at the lowest 
level. 0everal village panchayats are joined to form an 
intervillage panchayat samiti whose members are elected indirectly 
from village panchayats. Finally, at the top is the zila 
parisdad, and organization at the district level comprised of the 
presidents of the panchayat samitis, members of state legislatures 
110 
and Parliment who represent the district and district officers. 
Three important features suggest that rural government is maturing 
in India; (1) the clear improvement in quality of locally elected 
officals; (2) the beginnings of a tendency to raise local taxes 
for local purposes; (3) the gradual growth in recognition of 
local power over local developmental affaris. The continued growth 
of local government will lessen concern with ideology as a guide 
111 
and lead to a more pragmatic approach for decision- making. 
The Second Five- Year Plan marked 
a distinct departure in favor of 
the Feldman-~lahanobis type of 
structural model which emphasizes 
the physical aspect of investment 
and thus leads, subject to certain 
restrictive assumptions about 
transformation possibilities domestically 
and through foreign trade , to the 
proposition that the rising rate of 
investment requires increased 
domestic manufacturing of capital 
goods. 1l2 
This is a shift from the Keynesian "flow" analysis "rhich 
emphasized the necessity to raise savings (assumed savings could 
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be changed into inve stment) , to a lIstructuralist ll view whi ch 
emphasized the transformation constraint and the supply of 
capital goods to sustain growing investment (assumes that the 
system would generate savings to finance growing supply of 
113 
investment goods ). 
The .... econd Plan model .. ,as greatly influenced by the t,'TO -
sector gr01"th mode l developed by P . C. I',ahalanobis and also in-
dependently developed by Fe ldman in t he USSR in the 1920 ' s. 
Current investment flow 1 is divided into two parts' A I and 
t k t 
I , where 1 is the proportion going to capital goods sector 
c t ('k 
and)\C is the proportion going to the consump tion sector . 
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ince I - I = I \ ( 1 + '" B ) t - 1 ~ , by adding it to C - C , we ge t _ 
too kk ) t 0 
(8) C - C =(B ~) 
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Complete the solution for output at time = y _ 
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where~ = I / Y - the initial investment- income ratio. 
o o o 
A B is the asymptotic rate of growth in the system, where ~ 
k k ' k 
is the crucial allotment ratio for capital goods production . Thus 
a hip:her f... would al~Tays have a favorable effect on the asymptotic 
k 
17roVTth rate for the system, no matter whether it is consumption 
or outuut. Thus , the relative rate of growth in consumption or 
115 
output is changing over time. 
Hhile the assumption underlying the aggregative model was 
that the savings rate \'Tas reflected in the behavorial character-
is tics of the decision- makinp: units such as the household, the 
corporate sector or the government, l.ahalanobis effectively made 
it a rigid function of certain "structural" features such as 
ca:paci ty of the domestic capital goods industry and capi tal-
output ratios of the capital goods sector and consumer sector , 
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By making the allocation ratio of current investment eoing 
into the investment sector the policy variable, he skowed that 
a hieher allocation would mean a higher saving rate of growth 
116 
of output or consumption. 
There was much disenchantment and criticism with the Second 
Plan . The second year of th eplan suffered a sharp drop in 
agricultural production. For the fourth straight year , pro-
duction failed to top the 1953- 54 mark, while demand continued 
to increase. Previous criticism has been based on the assumption 
that the basic structures for achieveing agricultural development 
were correct and that they only needed refinement. However , this 
new criticism focused on the very foundation of the effort, 
117 
particularly the Community Deve lopment Program. 
The following recommendations came out of the criticism -
(1) a greater emphasis on agriculture, made tangible by the 
requirement that all of the village - level worker ' s time should be 
devoted to agricultural development acnivities; (2) an emphasis 
placed on inputs of agricultural production, since output was 
a function of input; (3) the recognition of complementary relation-
ship among all aspects of the development process and hence, of 
the fact that anyone missing element would nullify the influence 
of all the others. The outcome of this recommendation was a 118 
package program approach to agricultural development . 
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At the end of the Secon:t Plan there was satisfaction that 
targets had been met, but that the problems of agriculture had 
not been solved. The Intenisve Agricultural District Program 
(the Package Program) was instituted in 1961. The Package Program 
~Tas conceived as a set of pilot efforts that would demonstrate 
VThat could be done to agricultural production by a massive, well-
devised , concentrated attack on the agricultural problem. Its 
four major i~~ovations included - (1) emphasis on measures for 
immediate increase in agricultural production rather than increases 
for improving the general context for development or immediate 
welfare; (2) it chose for trial those districts most likely to 
respond to massive investment in agricultural production; (J) 
emphasis was directed toward profitability at farm level. Farm to 
farm variations in profitability were taken into account . (4) 
emphasis was on supplying the physical inputs of production, in 
principle, it included a wide range of inputs, in practice, it 
119 
was a fertilizer package. 
Unfortunately, the Package Program (1) failed to set up 
priorities and "ras excessively diffuse (2) it tended to ignore 
the problem of research and evaded institutional and managerial 
120 
aspects of the ,'later problem. 
The poor production record and rapidly rising prices which 
characterized the Third Five - Year Plan forced the government 1 s 
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attention to the price problem and the role of the merchant and 
trader in determining prices . The level of agricultural prices 
121 
is crucial to the economic and political life of Inida. There 
are four ways of dealing with rising food prices (1) increase 
agricultural production, but this not easy to accomplish. Further-
more, this solution will probably only be effective in the long-
run ; (2) a price- depressing mechanism including imports and price 
regulation; this ~ould be unpoplar with the farmers and may cause 
them to reduce production; ()) introduce rationing which will 
probably be ineffective as a long- run measure; (4) reduce the 
margin between farm and consumer prices eliminating or regulating 
the middleman . The standard response of the Indian government 
to the failure of the monsoon and rising prices has been asystem 
122 
of price controls, rationing and compulsory procurment . The 
basic objective is to provide a minimum ration at normal prices 
to the poor in the l arge urban centers . The problem is how to 
procure and distribute the necessary supplies in the face of sharp 
budgetary and administrative restrictions . The usual solution 
is compulsory procurement from farmers at prices which are low 
for a year of scarcity but more nearly at the level expected in 
normal crop years . There are restriction on movement of grain 
between states , however , because of the administrative and 
12) 
enforcement problems. 
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In general, government ventures into actual tradiJ:1-e; 
activities has been ineffective except to solve certain problems 
associated with extreme stress. This is due to the efficiency 
of the Indian private trading system . 
The Fourth Plan contained three features which characterized 
the development of agricultural planning during this period: (1) 
a considerable gro"l'rth in emphasis in the agricultural sector, 
rising in part out of the apparent failure of the agricultural 
sector during the Third Plan; (2) major emphasis on inorganic 
fertilizer as a key input of agricultural development, together 
with a turn towards greater allocations of foreign exchange to 
fertilizer imports and an increased interest in foreign collabor-
ations as a quick means of providing capital and technical information 
necessary for a rapid expansion of the domestic fertilizer industry; 
(3) the recognition of technical requirements of agricultural 
development and improvement in research aimed at providing pro -
124 
fitable innovation to farmers. 
A greater emphasis on agriculture can be seen in the decision 
for increased fertilizer allocations and improved administrative 
and salary structures for agricultural research . One of the 
major criticisms of Indian development is the emphasis on 
agriculture which developed at the end of the Third Plan was too 
late in coming. It must be realized that the basic approacr to 
Indian agricultural developmental planning h~S been evolutionary . 
Predictions of needs have been poor and planners have made the 
error of not planning the next step until the last step has 
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proven insufficient . This has caused much in loss of time 
which is a valuable commodity to the Indian population . If 
broad outlines could have been determined at the beginning, 
programs such as the Community Development Program might have 
proceeded while groundNork of research and other institutions were 
125 
being laid for the more effective programs of the future. 
The prerequistes for increased use of fertilizers in India 
are (1) a greater availability through domestic productions and 
imports; (2) a distribution system to transport the fertilizer to 
farmers in the time, place and form desired; (3) profitable 
opportunities for farmers to use the fertilizer. This last is a 
function of (a) research input as it effects the physical production 
function, (b) and extension programs as it effects the efficiency 
and skill with which farmers use fertilizer, (c) the availability 
of complementary resources such as water, and (d) a relationship 
between crop prices, prices of other inputs associated with 
126 
increased fertilizer use, and the price of the fertilizer. 
Distribution of fertilizer was in the hands of monopolostic 
cooperatives which were operated by managements with little 
training or incentive to sell fertilizer aggressively. The 
distribution mechanism discouraged overordering much more than 
underordering, encouraged late ordering and late arrival and provided 
no incentive to sell . 
There is also a tendency for agriculturalists to overstate the 
extent to which fertilizer has been profitable to Indian farmers . 
It is exceedingly important that intensive research be carried 
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on to increase the profitability of fertilizer application in 
areas 1-There it is already widely used . Despi te the position of 
rice as the most important food grain in India, the research 
situation for rice has been lagging. At the be~inning of the 
Fourth Plan, substantial success was had i',ith a short, stiff-stemmed 
variety of Nhe~t develoned in T.exico that resl)onded to heavy 
applications of fertilizer. "One of the most optomistic signs in 
Indian ap:-ricultural development is the clear evidence of an effective 
research program in developing plant varieties which transform very 
127 
large in!lUts of fertilizer into very hio:h yield." A major 
criticism of India ' s agricultural developmental 1)1annin~ has been 
that India has an unusally unfavorable fertilizer- to- crop price 
relationship, much less favorable in India than in the United ~tates 
or Japan. 
Because of the variability \'ri thin agriculture, new technolo",y 
must be specific to precise conditions of the area 1'There it is used; 
a situation ,-thich calls for .. ridespread systems of adaptive and basic 
research. Prior to the last ye~rs of the Third Plan, major expend-
iture on agricultural research had made no significant s ontribution 
to raising the yields of any of the major food grain crops. The 
problem was that the agricultural effort in India Nas \'lOrkinp: under 
the i'Trong assumption - "that India ,,,as looked upon as a poor country 
which could not afford fertilizer. It presumed it necessary to 
develop crop varieties .. ,hich could provide high yields ay loi', levels 
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of fertility , which was apparently impossible to 8.chieve . " 
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The Indian agricultural research system had an ample number of 
stations but lacked the coordination necessary for success . 
The development of a highly productive agriculture in India 
requires vast additional supplies of \,later and this \'las realized 
during the Fourth Plan . There was a total lack of knowledge 
concerning water management and water resources. There was little 
orljanized foreign assistance emphasis on \'later management problems 
in the early years of the Fourth Plan and major studies of water 
sources began to be made at the same time. 
lI~ducation is one of the key remaining weaknesses in Indian 
agricultural development programming , and in particular, the 
129 
critical importance of the technically competent extension worker." 
The basic error in t'1e Community Development Program and the 
extension program lay in placing excessive emphasiS on changing 
farmers ' attitudes toward innovation and insufficient emphasis 
on the technolo~y of chan~e. By placing the Community Development 
Program back under the hinistry of Agriculture in 1966, this 
emnhasis may have been re - established. 
In "'.ddi tion to negl"'cting technical competence, the Indian 
extension effort has neglested the function of research relating 
to communication of innovation and to the social processes involved 
1)0 
in rapid diffusion of knowledge . KnoNledp:e of the oatterns of 
village leadership, of the processes and patterns of communication, 
and of the functions of existing social structures can help speed 
the diffusion process. So far, little research of this type has 
been done , instead there has been done , instead there has been a 
129 
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tendency to transfere knowledge of these processes from the 
U~ited ~tates to India. 
During the Fourth Plan more attention Nas turned towards the 
question of the over- all level and the seasonal and year- to - year 
stability of agricultural prices. It became more epp8rent that 
farmers make their economic decisions with price as the signiificant 
variable . Var ious emperical studies of supply response indicated 
that farmers ~ill change their cropping patterns according to 
131 
relative price changes. 
Policy regarding the over- all level of agricultlJral prices is 
subject to conflicting political and economic pressures. On the 
political side it must be recognized that the bulk of the population 
is rural, but thet the urban population carries 60- 70 percent of 
the \~eight of food in the cost of living for industriak workers 
ho constitute a dominant urban influence on the politics of food 
prices. And there is the economic conflict there there is 
pressure to encourage hi~her prices, but at the same time there is 
also the difficult problem of capital formation which requires 
that measures which transfere income and savings to'rard agriculture 
be minimized. Rising agricultural prices puts up\~ard pressure 
on urban wages and not only reduces business profits but also 
squeezes public sector funds as well. Reduced capital formation 
in both the public and private sectors is the result. Finally, 
it is not clear whether higher prices w·ould encourage an increase 
in total agricultural production . It is possible that the 
incentives of farmers to produce are much more influenced by 
ready availability of consumer goods than by modest changes in 
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prices of agricultural commod.i ties . 
in fact little can :De done to change 
the over- all relationship of agricultural 
and nonagricultural prices except through 
changes in imports. The over- all price 
relationships are largely a product of 
relative supply and demand for agricultual 
and nonagricultural commodities. 
It is possible that a reduction in uncer -
tainity regarding agricultural prices 
achieved by reducing price fluctuations 
might bring about increased production 
without the unfortunate political and 
economic effects of a general rise in 
agricultural prices. However, there are 
major problems in reducing such fluct- 1 
uutions which still have not been solved . ~3 
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The use of these four plans as a planning mechanissm has led 
to general achievements during this period. The index number of 
agricultural output rose from 100 in 1949 to 139 in 1960- 61, 
while the index number for food grains rose to 135 . As a result, the 
per capita new domestiC availability of food grains increased from 
13.5 to 16 . 2 ounces per day from 1951 to 1961, a rise of 17 percent. 
'l'he total production of nonfood grains rose by 47 percent compared 
with 1949- 50, and that is faster than the production of food 
134 
grains , which rose 35 percent. 
T.,uch of the problem of the Indian agricultural situation 
lies the general characteristics of the Five - Year plans . It must 
be admitted that, on many counts, these p lans have failed in their 
purpose. This is seen in the need to adandon the Fourth Plan 
after two years into that particular plan period. Why do these 
plans fail? The answer may be that the Indians "are more effective 
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as intellectualizers than as doers." 
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The dichotomy between ideals and 
reality, and even between enA~ted 
legislation and implementation, 
should be seen against the back~round 
that India, like the other ~outh 
Asian countries, is a soft state. 
There is an unwillingness among the 
rulers to impose obligations on the 
governed and a corresponding unwill -
ingness on their part to obey rules 
laid down by democratic orocedures. 1 36 
Indian planning does not appear to 
be an indicator of realisitc goals 
or actual accomplishments to be 
achieved in production and consumption. 
If a person Nere to study the Indian 
economy on the basis of its Five -
Year plans , he would not know whence 
the economy came, where it is presently, 
and where it is ~oing. Indi~n 
planning is misleadin by its suggestion 
of orderliness in an economy that 
actually operates in a chaotic manner1 37 
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Indeed , the Indian agricultrual sector has come a long way 
S i n c e independenc e , but its greatest challenge awaits it in the 
year s ahead. The agricultural progress made in the last few 
y ear s has con v inc ed many obser vers of the p ossibility for India 
to f eed her r ap i d l y growi ng p opulation . This is India ' a central 
p roblem a t t he mone nt - to i mpr ove the rati o of food supply to 
p op ulation. 
while no dramtic decrease in t he birth rate can be expected , 
India ' s hope lies in increasing the a~ricultural out put . The 
new developme ntal scheme enacted in 1969 following t he f a ilure of 
the Fourth Plan strieves to increase output. Ori p: inally ca lled 
the Intensive Agricultural District Program, it is now called 
136 , 
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The "Green Revolution . " It contrats sharply 'Ti th the Community 
Development Pro~ram which tended to disperse scarse resources 
over all the 500,000 villages, for the district program concentrates 
138 
on one distr i ct in each state . 
This program guarentees to all cultivators in a district the 
inputs required to assure increases in output of 50 to 150 percent. 
The typical Indian production per acre is so 10N that increases 
of this nature are not impossible. "But such revolutionary 
changes require not only intensive preliminary demonstration and 
planning and training for each individual farmer, but alsothat 
all the components of the package be delivered on time and in the 
139 
rio:ht amount.1I 
The nrinciple elements of the pflc1(a£:;' are 1'later, ne"T hip;h-
yielding seeds, fertilizer suitable for local soils, pesticides, 
labor to meet peak reqUirements, credit at economic interest rates, 
fa.rm- to - market road_s, drying and storage facilities, truck and 
rail tr~nsport, incentive prices and floor prices. ith 20 
million acres of India ' s total cultivated acreage of 372 million 
under the high- yielding seeds, success has been retarded by the 
unsuitability of the seeds to many of Indian agricultural conditions . 
140 
This is particularly true of rice, by far the lar~est crop. 
138 Brookes, R. R. , "Inc1ia J s Central Problem Is hol'! To Imnrove 
Ratio of l"ood to population , " ~!ew York 'I'imes , January 19 , 1970 , p . 68. 
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If India is to sustain [!;rol'Tth , the follot'!ing are neceaasry -
(1) at least some political stability ; (2) a praematic approach 
to agricultural r esearch ; (3) an increase in domestic savings; 
141 
(4) and outside~help in assuring adequate foreign exchange. 
141 Lelyveld , Joseph , tI ' Green Revolution ' Transforming Indian 
But It Has A Long Hay 'ro Go . II New York Times, Hay 28 , 1969, Farming , 
po 12 . 
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